South Korea’s long-running birth slump is showing tentative signs of stabilization. But the data suggest the rebound is being driven less by a revival among younger families than by delayed childbirth concentrated among women in their late 30s and 40s—raising doubts about how durable the trend will be.
According to data released by Statistics Korea, birthrates among women aged 35 to 39 rose year over year for 11 consecutive months through November 2025. During the January–November period, the average birthrate for this group reached 51.7 births per 1,000 women, up from 46.6 a year earlier, marking a return to the low-50s range for the first time in several years.
Births among women in their 40s also continued to edge higher. The average birthrate for women aged 40 and above stood at 4.4 births per 1,000 women over the same period, compared with 4.1 a year earlier, reflecting a steady—if modest—upward drift.
By contrast, momentum among younger women has weakened. Birthrates for women aged 30 to 34, traditionally the core childbearing cohort, averaged 73.3 births per 1,000 women from January through November, slightly higher than the 71.0 recorded a year earlier. But the improvement has stalled in recent months, with year-over-year declines recorded in both October and November.
Among women in their 20s, trends remain volatile. Birthrates for women aged 25 to 29 posted brief gains in September and October before slipping again in November, while rates for women aged 24 and under were largely flat or lower year over year. Demographers say the data point to a narrowing pipeline of future mothers, even as older cohorts temporarily lift headline figures.
The shift reflects South Korea’s steadily rising age of marriage. The average age at first marriage for women reached 31.6 years in 2024, up from 30.0 in 2015, according to government data. As marriage moves deeper into the 30s, first births are following suit, compressing childbearing into a shorter and biologically constrained window.
In that sense, the recent rise in births among older women reflects delayed execution rather than renewed confidence in family formation. Many of the births now being recorded are the result of decisions postponed for years, not new choices emerging among younger generations.
For policymakers eager to demonstrate progress in reversing the world’s lowest fertility rate—South Korea’s total fertility rate stood at 0.72 in 2023—the distinction is critical. A rebound led by older mothers can stabilize short-term numbers, but it offers limited support for long-term population growth.
Demographers warn that age-skewed recovery carries structural risks. Older maternal age is associated with higher medical costs, lower probabilities of second or third births, and reduced capacity to sustain birthrates over time. One delayed birth, they note, does not offset multiple births that never occur.
The trend also exposes the limits of South Korea’s policy approach. Despite years of subsidies, housing support and childcare incentives, the core drivers of delayed marriage—job insecurity, high housing costs, long working hours and persistent gender imbalances in caregiving—remain largely unresolved.
As a result, many policies have functioned less as preventive tools and more as accommodations for delay, helping couples who marry and have children later rather than lowering barriers earlier in adulthood.
Officials argue that the recent stabilization itself is meaningful, signaling that the downward spiral may be slowing. But critics caution that without renewed momentum among women in their 20s and early 30s, the current rebound risks becoming a demographic mirage—visible in statistics, but fragile beneath the surface.
South Korea’s experience underscores a broader reality confronting aging economies: birthrates can be nudged upward, but timing matters as much as totals. When recovery depends on older mothers, the window for long-term reversal narrows.
For now, the data offer cautious optimism. Whether they mark the start of a sustainable turnaround—or the final echo of postponed parenthood—will depend on whether younger generations see a future in which starting families earlier once again feels possible.
